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Abstract 
 
 
This paper examines the relationship between teacher tenure and teacher quality in North 
Carolina, measured via student performance on the state End of Grade (EOG) 
standardized tests.  After presenting a comprehensive synopsis of the current teacher 
tenure policy, I use data from the North Carolina Education Research Data Center 
(NCERDC) to compare demonstrated teacher effectiveness across the tenure bubble, 
defined as one to eight years of teaching experience within the same district.  Ultimately, 
I find that there is a significant jump in average teacher quality at the tenure cutoff, 
suggesting that tenure policy is effective in retaining high quality teachers while 
removing those who are ineffective.   
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I.  Introduction 
It is widely accepted by educators, policymakers, and researchers that teacher 
quality plays a significant role in determining students’ academic success and long-term 
economic prosperity.  A highly effective teacher improves both students’ academic 
learning in the short-term and their long-term quality of life.  Using the teacher value-
added measure, one proxy for teacher quality, Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff (2013) 
demonstrate that students with a highly effective teacher not only improve their end-of-
year test scores in that year, but are also more likely to graduate high school, matriculate 
to college, and earn higher incomes (as compared to their peers with a low value-added 
teacher).  A single year with a high value-added teacher is shown to increase a student’s 
cumulative lifetime income by an average of $80,000, or nearly 2% of total lifetime 
earnings.1  These effects are cumulative, with each additional year of high quality 
instruction continually improving student learning and long-term success.2 
Given the demonstrated importance of quality teachers, much attention has been 
paid to the attraction and retention of highly effective teachers.  One such policy, teacher 
tenure, is the subject of recent education reform debates.  While teacher tenure provides 
effective teachers with job security and protection from wrongful termination, it also 
makes it difficult to remove teachers who are ineffective in the classroom.3  From a labor 
economics lens, the job security provided by tenure policies could alter incentives for 
                                                 
1 Raj Chetty, John N. Friedman, and Jonah E. Rockoff, “The Long-Term Impacts of Teachers: Teacher 
Value-Added and Student Outcomes in Adulthood,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working 
Paper 19423 (2013): 41-44.    
 
2 Ron Haskins and Susanna Loeb, “A Plan to Improve the Quality of Teaching in American Schools,” The 
Future of Children (2007): 1-2.  
     
3 M.J. Stephey, “A Brief History of Tenure,” Time, November 17, 2008, http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1859505,00.html.   
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teacher behavior, thus impacting teacher effectiveness.  The aim of my research is to 
evaluate the effects of tenure policy on teacher quality and the resulting student 
performance, particularly in North Carolina.    
My analysis focuses solely on North Carolina for three reasons.  First, the 
motivation for this research stems partially from the state’s unique policies regarding 
collective bargaining and teacher tenure.  Additionally, thanks to the establishment of the 
North Carolina Education Research Data Center (NCERDC) in 2000, North Carolina’s 
education data is some of the most thorough in the country, making it a good site for 
empirical research.  Finally, this research is particularly relevant in North Carolina right 
now, given that the state government recently passed massive teacher tenure reform that 
will gradually eliminate tenure for the majority of teachers in the next five years (but has 
yet to go into effect).4  Thus, it is natural to evaluate the existing policy before the 
upcoming changes take place.   
Before examining this from an empirical angle, this paper presents background 
information on North Carolina’s teacher tenure and collective bargaining laws from a 
policy standpoint.  This discussion serves to contextualize my empirical findings within 
North Carolina’s unique educational landscape.  Then, using data from the NCERDC, I 
focus on the average quality of teachers across the tenure bubble, both before and after 
they receive tenure.  Ultimately, I am interested to see if there are empirically observable 
differences in quality between teachers who do and do not have tenure.  As will be 
discussed in further detail later in the paper, the goal of an optimal teacher hiring practice 
is to attract and retain high quality teachers while removing those who are ineffective in 
                                                 4	  Lynn Bonner, “Proposed NC Budget Would End Teacher Tenure, Pay Tuition Vouchers,” News 
Observer, July 21, 2013, http://www.newsobserver.com/2013/07/21/3046589/state-­‐budget-­‐would-­‐end-­‐teacher.html.	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the classroom.  I am investigating whether or not North Carolina’s existing tenure policy 
achieves this goal.   
Specifically, I examine how demonstrated teacher effectiveness, measured via 
student performance, differs between tenured and non-tenured teachers. To address this 
question, I use a measure of teacher quality, called teacher fixed effects, to compare the 
average teacher quality across the tenure bubble.  As teachers in North Carolina are 
eligible to receive tenure after four years of teaching, this tenure bubble is defined as 
years one through eight.  I am interested to see if there are any changes in demonstrated 
teacher quality, measured via student performance, before (years one through four) and 
after (years five through eight) tenure is granted.  Given that student test score 
performance is one accepted measure of teacher effectiveness, this allows me to draw 
preliminary conclusions about the relationship between teacher tenure and teacher quality 
and effectiveness in North Carolina.   
This paper begins with an overview of the current landscape for teachers in North 
Carolina, summarizing teacher salary, tenure, and evaluation policies.  It then presents a 
review of relevant literature on contract incentives, teacher experience, and teacher 
behavior.  Moving into the empirical analysis, an explanation and summary of the 
primary variables used in the analysis follows.  Finally, a non-parametric specification is 
used to compare average teacher quality across the tenure bubble, leading to preliminary 
conclusions about the effectiveness of North Carolina’s teacher tenure policy in retaining 
high quality teachers while removing those who appear ineffective.  
II.  Background 
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As it stands, collective bargaining is currently prohibited in the state of North 
Carolina, thus rendering a formal teachers union illegal.  As one would expect with a lack 
of collective bargaining power, teacher salaries in North Carolina are relatively low when 
compared with those in other states.5  According to a 2013 report from the National 
Education Association (NEA), the starting salary for public school teachers in North 
Carolina is $30,778, the third lowest in the nation.  Compared to the 2011-2012 school 
year, the national average starting teacher salary rose 1.5% in 2013, reaching $36,141, 
while North Carolina’s wage stayed constant.  Teacher salaries in North Carolina are 
consistently about 15% below the national average and in stark comparison to the nearly 
$50,000 paid to new teachers in states with a strong union presence (such as New 
Jersey).6  Acknowledging this discrepancy, current North Carolina Governor Pat 
McCrory recently proposed an increase in teacher salaries.  If passed, the proposal will 
raise starting teacher pay to $35,000 (still below the current national average) by the 
2015-16 school year, an almost 14% percent increase from current wages.7   
Despite relatively low salaries, under the current law teachers in the state are 
eligible to receive tenure after four consecutive years of teaching in the same public 
school district.  A year of teaching is defined as at least 120 full-time workdays.  
Workdays are stated to include teacher development days (in which students are not 
present), but do not include vacation or sick days.  To be eligible for tenure, these four 
                                                 
5 Barry T. Hirsch, David A. Macpherson, and John V. Winters, “Teacher Salaries, State Collective 
Bargaining Laws, and Union Coverage,” prepared for American Economic Association Meetings, San 
Diego (January 6, 2013): 10.    
 
6 National Education Association, 2012-2013 Average Starting Teacher Salaries by State, compiled from 
the Collective Bargaining/Member Advocacy Database (December, 2013).  
 
7 Lynn Bonner and Jane Stancill, “McCrory Seeks to Raise Teachers Starting Pay,” News Observer, 
February 10, 2014, http://www.newsobserver.com/2014/02/10/3608266/mccrory-­‐increase-­‐teachers-­‐base.html.   
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full years must be completed consecutively within the same school district.  The only 
exception to this rule is medical leave (sick, disability, or maternity), in which the part-
time year does not count toward tenure eligibility but does not break the chain of 
consecutive teaching years.  For example, if a teacher completes two full (120 day) 
school years in a district, followed by a year of less than 120 days due to vacation time, 
followed by two more full years (all in the same district), they are not yet eligible for 
tenure.  However, if a teacher completes two full years in a district, followed by a year of 
less than 120 days due to medical leave, followed by two more full years in that same 
district, they are eligible for tenure.  Furthermore, as tenure is awarded at the district 
level, years of teaching experience do not necessarily transfer with teachers who switch 
school districts (this decision is left to the individual districts). 8 
Using the above criteria, at the conclusion of each school year the district 
superintendent submits a list of all teachers that are eligible for tenure to the district board 
of education.  For each teacher on this list, the superintendent includes his or her 
recommendation for whether or not the teacher should be awarded tenure.  There are no 
common, explicitly stated criteria for this recommendation; rather they are based on 
teacher evaluations by the school over the teacher’s career.  For each teacher on this list, 
the board of education then votes to either award the teacher tenure or not.  Teachers who 
are not awarded tenure are dismissed from the district.9 
The primary benefit of tenure for teachers is not an increase in salary, but an 
element of job security.  North Carolina classifies teachers as either probationary (years 
                                                 
8 Robert P. Joyce, The Law of Employment in North Carolina’s Public Schools (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2000), 396-399.    
 
9 Joyce, The Law of Employment in North Carolina’s Public Schools, 399-400.    
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one through four) or tenured (also called career teachers).  If deemed ineffective by the 
school or district, probationary teachers can simply be dismissed at the end of the school 
year by the local board of education.  Tenured teachers, on the other hand, can be 
discharged only for specific reasons (detailed in G.S.115C-325(e)(1)) and are legally 
entitled to due process if the district seeks to dismiss them.10  Under the North Carolina 
Teacher Tenure Act, tenure protection is not directly tied to a teacher’s specific 
employment, but rather to their salary.  For example, a teacher may be transferred from a 
preferred teaching assignment to a less desirable school or subject without violation of 
the act, as long as their salary remains the same.11  
Tenured teachers in North Carolina are also subject to more relaxed teacher 
evaluation procedures.  While probationary teachers undergo frequent detailed evaluation 
throughout the year, tenured teachers are evaluated only during years of licensure 
renewal with an abridged process and rubric.12  North Carolina’s teacher evaluation 
strategy is cited as an assessment both of teaching and for teaching, meaning teacher 
evaluation is designed to help teachers continually improve their practice. 13  Thus, this 
policy of limited evaluation for tenured teachers has potential implications for teacher 
effectiveness and student performance.   
As the outlined tenure and evaluation policies apply only to traditional public 
school teachers, my analysis does not include private schools or public charter schools.  
                                                 
10 North Carolina General Assembly, Principal and Teacher Employment Contracts, G.S.115C-325(c-e)(1).   
 
11 Joyce, The Law of Employment in North Carolina’s Public Schools, 379-382. 
  
12 McREL in collaboration with the North Carolina State Board of Education, North Carolina Teacher 
Evaluation Process (2009): 19. 
    
13 Olivia Little, Laura Goe, and Courtney Bell, “A Practical Guide to Evaluating Teacher Effectiveness,” 
National Comprehensive Center for Teacher Quality (2009): 15-16.  
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Given the nature of their funding, private institutions are not subject to these government 
policies and are free to create their own protocols for hiring and dismissing teachers.  
Though publicly funded, charter schools have similar freedoms to construct their own 
teacher contract and evaluation practices.  Thus, it is natural to focus solely on teachers in 
traditional public schools.   
III.  Literature Review 
The relationship between tenure and behavior is a subset of a broader research 
area in labor economics, called personnel economics, which examines how contracts and 
pay structure impact incentives and behavior.  In a seminal paper in personnel economics, 
Lazear (2000) studies the relationship between performance pay and worker productivity.  
He concludes that switching to a piece-rate pay system significantly increases worker 
productivity in a factory setting.  More relevant to my research, Lazear finds that about 
half of the increase in productivity results from the firm’s new ability to attract and retain 
the most productive workers. 14  This finding demonstrates the important role that hiring 
practices, such as tenure policy, play in determining overall firm productivity. 
Furthermore, Lazear finds that switching to a piece-rate pay structure leads to 
more variation in output.  This suggests that without the extra economic incentive of 
piece-rate pay, more productive workers refrain from working to their highest ability.15 
This observed variation in productivity is pertinent to my research, as tenured teachers 
may not have the same incentives to differentiate themselves from their fellow teachers 
as probationary teachers do.  On the other hand, given that their jobs are secure, it is 
                                                 
14 Edward P. Lazear, “Performance Pay and Productivity,” American Economic Review 90, no. 5 (2000): 
1346-1347.  
   
15 Lazear, “Performance Pay and Productivity,” 1347.   
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possible that tenured teachers are better able to experiment with new teaching methods 
and thus improve their practice, whereas probationary teachers feel a need to stick to the 
status quo in order to earn tenure.  These possible complex effects of tenure policy 
provide further motivation to evaluate its effectiveness and implications on student 
performance.     
Finally, it should be noted that discussion of this literature is not to suggest that a 
piece-rate pay structure for teachers will improve teacher productivity and effectiveness, 
but rather to introduce some of the previously identified ways that contracts can impact 
behavior. 
This so-called “contract phenomenon” is not limited to a factory setting and has 
been applied to a variety of topics, from sports performance to business seasonality.16  To 
elaborate, Heubeck and Scheuer (2003) examine how player performance varies over the 
course of an athlete’s contract, finding that on average athletes’ performance increases 
during a year leading up their contract renewal.17  My research applies this phenomenon 
to teaching, an area with a drastically different pay scale and contract structure than 
professional sports.  However, using a similar framework, I aim to discern the 
relationship between teacher tenure contracts and teacher effectiveness.    
In the area of education, there has been much research on the relationship between 
teacher experience and teacher quality, as measured in terms of student performance.  
While earlier literature found that beyond the first three years of teaching, the returns to 
                                                 
16 Paul Over, “Fiscal Year Ends and Nonlinear Incentive Contracts: The Effect on Business Seasonality,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 113, no. 1 (1998): 149-85.   
 
17	  Tina Heubeck and Jochen Scheuer, “Incentive Clauses in Players’ Contracts in Team Sports- Theory and 
Practice,” German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2003 (2003): 1-30.  	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teacher experience are insignificant,18 Wiswall’s (2013) recent paper concludes that there 
continues to be a statistically significant relationship between teacher quality and teacher 
experience.  Thus, in the simplest terms, he shows that teacher experience beyond the 
third year still matters in terms of teacher effectiveness and the resulting student 
performance.  These new results are justified by the fact that unlike previous research, 
Wiswall is able to account for teachers leaving the profession after their first few years of 
teaching.  In fact, he also finds that high quality teachers are more likely to exit teaching, 
as they tend to have a higher general skill level and are thus able to switch to more 
lucrative careers.19  This suggests that tenure policy could be important in improving not 
just overall teacher retention, but specifically the retention of high quality teachers, by 
offering a job security incentive in place of a higher salary.  The policy implications of 
Wiswall’s research are twofold.  Policymakers should aim to create a policy that allows 
for the dismissal of low quality teachers while incentivizing those who are more effective 
to continue teaching.  My empirical research builds off of this, serving as a preliminary 
test to how effective tenure policy is in removing low quality teachers while retaining 
those who are highly effective.   
On the topic of evaluating the relationship between contract structure and teacher 
behavior, Jacob’s (2010) paper examines the effects of a new teacher tenure policy on 
teacher productivity in the Chicago Public Schools (CPS).  He focuses on a policy 
enacted by CPS in 2004, which enables principals to dismiss teachers with less than five 
years of experience (deemed probationary teachers by CPS) without the due process and 
                                                 
18 Douglas N. Harris and Tim R. Sass, “Teacher training, teacher quality, and student achievement, Journal 
of Public Economics 95 (2011): 798-812.    
 
19 Matthew Wiswall, “The Dynamics of Teacher Quality,” Journal of Public Economics 100 (2013): 61-78. 
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resulting bureaucratic difficulty that traditionally comes with dismissing tenured teachers.  
Using a difference-in-difference estimator to measure changes in teacher absences before 
and after the policy change, Jacob finds that teacher absences fell by 10-20% following 
the new policy’s introduction.20  This suggests that a change in contract structure alters 
teacher productivity and could in turn affect student performance.  My research differs 
from Jacob’s in three key aspects.  First, Chicago has a strong teachers’ union with 
collective bargaining power, while North Carolina has no formal teachers’ union and 
collective bargaining is legally prohibited.  This difference is reflected in the gap in 
teacher salaries between Chicago and North Carolina,21 but not in their teacher tenure 
policies.  Second, my empirical analysis uses student performance as a measure of 
teacher quality and effectiveness, while Jacob relies on rates of teacher absenteeism as a 
proxy for teacher productivity.  Finally, my research differs from Jacobs’ in primary 
empirical methodology.  While he uses a difference-in-difference estimator to examine 
how tenure status determines teacher behavior, this paper employs a non-parametric 
specification to discern the relationship between teacher tenure and teacher effectiveness.  
Shifting the focus from teacher quality to teacher-student matching, Clotfelter, 
Ladd, and Vigdor (2006) use North Carolina data to examine how teachers and students 
are matched, testing the hypothesis that more qualified teachers are more likely to work 
with students from more affluent backgrounds, with higher levels of parental education, 
and higher scores on the previous year’s state assessment.  They find statistically 
                                                 
20 Brian A. Jacob, “The Effect of Employment Protection on Worker Effort: Evidence from Public 
Schooling,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 19655 (2010): 1-40.         
 
21 National Education Association, 2012-2013 Average Starting Teacher Salaries by State, compiled from 
the Collective Bargaining/Member Advocacy Database (December, 2013).  	  
 14 
significant evidence of this positive assortative teacher-student matching both between 
and within schools, with the effect being larger when comparing matching across 
different schools.  This may be attributed to the strong forces of parents and teachers; 
teachers choose where to work and parents choose where to send their children to school 
(either directly through a school choice policy, or indirectly by choosing what district to 
live in).  The effect is smaller but still significant within schools, in which teachers and 
parents have more limited power in influencing teacher-student matching.  The authors’ 
findings also give rise to a debate regarding equity versus efficiency, as they find that the 
returns from having a higher quality teacher on students’ math scores are larger for more 
affluent, higher performing students. 22  Thus, reassigning higher quality teachers to less 
affluent, lower performing students could reduce overall average math test scores.  This 
provides a possible explanation for the observed equilibrium of positive assortative 
teacher-student matching, as well as for the achievement gap between low and high-
income students.  Though my research is not focused on teacher-student matching, it is 
still an interesting and relevant topic to consider.  A possible extension of my research 
and a topic for further study could build off of this paper, applying their techniques to an 
analysis of teacher-student matching for teachers with and without tenure.   
IV.  Data 
All of my empirical research is conducted using data from the NCERDC, a 
project launched by the Duke University Center for Child and Family Policy and the 
                                                 
22 Charles T. Clotfelter, Helen F. Ladd, and Jacob L. Vigdor, “Teacher-Student Matching and the 
Assessment of Teacher Effectiveness,” Journal of Human Resources 41, no. 4 (2006): 778-820. 
 
 15 
North Carolina Department of Public Instruction (NCDPI) in 2000.23  The goal of the 
project is twofold.  First, the NCERDC aims to store and compile existing education data, 
dating back to the mid-1990s, into a streamlined, standardized format.  The project also 
continues to collect current data on North Carolina’s public schools, teachers, and 
students.  In addition to collecting their own data, the NCERDC also has access to data 
stores from the NCDPI and the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES).  Thus, it 
is a rich source of data for my empirical analysis.    
The NCERDC data is broken down into five levels: student, teacher, classroom, 
school, and district.  Each level contains different datasets, which contain various 
variables that fall under the category of that dataset.  Given the focus of my analysis, my 
research uses data that fall under the student and teacher levels.  Though each dataset is 
compiled over a specific time period, generally from 1996-2011, my research focuses on 
data collected in 2004, at the conclusion of the 2003-04 school year.  This choice of the 
2004 dataset is made to resolve issues of score standardization between years and allow 
for an adequate range of teacher experience.   
The following is a discussion of the primary variables in my analysis, including 
student test scores, teacher fixed effects, and teacher district experience.  
A.  End of Grade Tests 
Every public school student in North Carolina in grades three through eight is 
required to take the standardized End of Grade (EOG) exam.  Administered at the 
conclusion of each grade, typically during the last fifteen days of the school year, EOG 
                                                 
23 Duke University Center for Child and Family Policy, North Carolina Education Research Data Center 
(NCERDC), accessed December 4, 2013, https://childandfamilypolicy.duke.edu/project_detail.php?id=35.  
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exams cover English language arts (referred to as ‘reading’), mathematics, and science.  
Each grade is tested in reading and math, with students completing fifth and eighth grade 
taking an additional science EOG subject test.  As the science test is only administered in 
these two grades, it is omitted from my analysis.  A student’s raw test score corresponds 
to one of four levels of mastery in that subject (I-IV).  Levels I and II are considered 
below grade-level, while levels III and IV are considered at or above grade-level. 24  
Thus, EOG scores are a natural measure of student performance.   
To further introduce the use of EOG test scores, let us look at the test score 
distributions in 2004 (the relevant year for my analysis).  Table 1 is a summary of the 
EOG test scores for grades four through eight.  The table shows the number of 
observations, minimum and maximum scores, as well as the mean and standard deviation 
of the score distribution.  Since a measure of prior score is necessary for my analysis and 
EOG tests are first given in grade three, my empirical analysis focuses on grades four 
through eight.  This means that the number of observations in my dataset is reduced by 
about 16% compared to the original, comprehensive dataset for grades three through 
eight.  To remove outliers and account for students who did not take the exam or those 
with unreported scores, students with scores of zero in either subject exam are dropped 
from the dataset.  Additionally, as previously explained, all public charter school students 
are dropped from the dataset as well.  These omissions account for only about 5% of the 
overall dataset, with over 350,000 student observations remaining.  Given these 
trimmings, the findings presented below are for traditional public school students in 
grades four through eight only.  These observations are distributed roughly equally 
                                                 
24 NCDPI Division of Accountability Services, The North Carolina Testing Program: 2012-2013, July 
2012, http://www.ncpublicschools.org/docs/accountability/nctpoverview1213.pdf.  
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between grades, with each of grades four through eight accounting for about 20% of the 
sample.   
Table 1 
SUMMARY OF EOG TEST SCORES, GRADES 4-8 
READING 
GRADE TOTAL OBSERVATIONS 
MINIMUM 
SCORE 
MAXIMUM 
SCORE MEAN 
STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
4 68400 224 275 252.8 8.5 
5 71471 230 277 257.4 7.8 
6 71362 229 283 259.2 8.4 
7 71720 228 287 261.7 8.8 
8 69819 233 290 264.4 8.7 
All (4-8) 352772 224 290 259.1 9.3 
 
MATHEMATICS 
GRADE TOTAL OBSERVATIONS 
MINIMUM 
SCORE 
MAXIMUM 
SCORE MEAN 
STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
4 68400 232 282 259.6 7.4 
5 71471 233 291 263.1 8.7 
6 71362 236 293 266.4 9.3 
7 71720 231 307 269.1 10.8 
8 69819 238 307 272.5 10.6 
All (4-8) 352772 231 307 266.2 10.5 
 
SOURCE. –  North Carolina Education Research Data Center, EOG Grades 4-8, 2004 
 
Given his or her raw test score, each student is designated a level (I-IV) of 
mastery in that subject.  Table 2 displays the score cutoffs for each of the four levels, by 
grade, for the 2004 EOG exam.  As mentioned above, levels I and II are considered 
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below grade-level, while levels III and IV are considered at or above grade-level.  In 
terms of mastery level, level I is deemed insufficient mastery, level II inconsistent 
mastery, level III consistent mastery, and level IV superior performance.  These score 
cutoffs represent a developmental scale designed by an in-state psychometrician to reflect 
learning over time.  Since these levels of mastery are determined by the state of North 
Carolina, they are not meant to serve as a comparison between states.  Furthermore, this 
system is designed so that a student’s raw score should increase each year, but the score 
cutoffs for each grade change so that said student is expected to remain in the same level.  
For example, a fourth-grade student with a raw score of 244 on the reading exam falls in 
level III.  When that same student is in fifth grade, he or she is expected to score at least 
247 to remain in level III.  Evidence of this developmental scale is clear in Table 2.     
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Table 2 
EOG SCORE CUTOFFS, GRADES 4-8 
READING 
GRADE LEVEL I LEVEL II LEVEL III LEVEL IV 
4 223-235 236-243 244-254 255-275 
5 228-238 239-246 247-258 259-277 
6 228-241 242-251 252-263 264-283 
7 228-242 243-251 252-263 264-287 
8 231-243 244-253 254-265 266-290 
 
MATHEMATICS 
GRADE LEVEL I LEVEL II LEVEL III LEVEL IV 
4 221-239 240-246 247-257 258-285 
5 221-242 243-249 250-259 260-285 
6 228-246 247-253 254-264 265-296 
7 231-249 250-257 258-266 267-307 
8 235-253 254-260 261-271 272-310 
 
SOURCE. –  North Carolina Education Research Data Center, Codebook EOG Grades  
     4-8, 2004 
  To bring these two tables together in a graphical manner, Figures 1 and 2 display 
the score distributions for the reading and mathematics exams, respectively, for fourth-
grade students in 2004.  The x-marks indicate the score cutoffs for each of the four levels, 
as given in Table 2.  The score distributions for grades five through eight look similar and 
can be found in the Appendix.   
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Figure 1 
EOG READING SCORE DISTRIBUTION, GRADE 4 
 
 
  SOURCE. –  North Carolina Education Research Data Center, EOG Grade 4, 2004 
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Figure 2 
EOG MATHEMATICS SCORE DISTRIBUTION, GRADE 4 
 
 
SOURCE. –  North Carolina Education Research Data Center, EOG Grade 4, 2004 
 
Here, the average reading score (252.8) and the average mathematics score 
(259.6) fall within the level III and level IV ranges for fourth-grade students, 
respectively.  This indicates that, on average, students performed at or above grade-level 
and achieved at least a consistent mastery of both subjects.  However, the distribution of 
these scores is highly variant.  In both reading and math, a single standard deviation is 
equal to roughly the range of an entire level.  For example, while an average fourth-grade 
student falls into level III in reading with a score of 252.8, a single standard deviation 
(8.5) above or below the mean places students in levels II and IV, respectively.  This 
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trend is exhibited in both subjects and all grades, suggesting that student test scores are 
generally a relatively variant measure.   
When using student test score performance as a proxy for student achievement, it 
is also important to note that the mathematics test requires the use of both reading and 
math skills.  Given that the questions are formatted as ‘word problems,’ a student who 
has difficulty reading will automatically have difficulty with the mathematics test.  Thus, 
the test scores are not necessarily a pure reflection of solely math knowledge.   
Finally, to contextualize the levels of mastery, it is important to keep in mind the 
policy implications.  From a program and policy perspective, most teacher efforts and 
interventions at any level (classroom, school, district, state, national) are aimed at level II 
and III students.  This is unsurprising given the monetary incentives attached to school 
accountability.  Neal and Schanzenbach (2010) find concrete evidence of this 
phenomenon after the introduction of No Child Left Behind in 2002.25  For example, if a 
school needs a certain percentage of students to perform at grade-level in the upcoming 
year in order to receive increased funding, teachers and schools tend to focus their 
attention on getting students who are near the threshold up to grade-level (level II 
students) and making sure students right at the threshold do not fall below it (level III 
students).  This demonstrates the importance, particularly from a policy standpoint, of 
small, incremental changes in student standardized test score performance. 
B.  Teacher Fixed Effects 
In order to link student EOG test score performance to teacher quality, I construct 
a measure called teacher fixed effects.  This variable estimates a teacher’s average effect 
                                                 
25 Derek Neal and Diane W. Schanzenbach, “Left Behind By Design: Proficiency Counts and Test-Based 
Accountability,” Review of Economics and Statistics 92 (2010): 263-283.  
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on the test scores of his or her students in a given year.  To construct this variable, I first 
sort the EOG score datasets by student.  Since this dataset is at the student level, each set 
of test scores in a given year is linked to a specific student by an identification code 
(mastid).  I also introduce a combined score measure (comb = read + math), which is 
created simply by summing a student’s scores on the reading and mathematics EOG 
exams.  By merging the datasets from the previous year, I am able to create prior score 
variables for each test (‘readprior’ and ‘mathprior’, as well as ‘combprior’).  For 
example, a 2004 fourth-grade student’s prior EOG scores are given in the 2003 EOG 
dataset for grade three.  By merging these datasets together and sorting by student 
identification number, I am able to construct the prior score variables.  These same steps 
are taken to construct prior score measures for students in grades four through eight 
(grade three is omitted as there is no EOG exam for grade two, and thus no measure of 
prior score) in 2004.  Using this data, I run a regression comparing student EOG test 
scores in 2004 to their scores in 2003.  In order to allow for grade-specific intercepts, I 
include an indicator variable for grades four through seven (the indicator for grade eight 
is omitted to prevent collinearity).  To account for varying slopes across grades, I include 
interaction terms between the grade-specific indicators and the prior score variable.    
  The equations below were used to specify the regressions:   
(1) readi = a0 + a1g Gig + a2g(Gig x readpriori) + ui, 
(2) mathi = a0 + a1g Gig + a2g(Gig x mathpriori) + ui, 
(3) combi = a0 + a1g Gig + a2g(Gig x combpriori) + ui, 
where readi is student i’s EOG reading score in the current year (2004), Gig is an 
indicator variable for student i’s grade (g) in the current year,  and Gig x readpriori is the 
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interaction term between student i’s grade in the current year and his or her EOG reading 
score in the previous year (2003).  The math and combined score variables are specified 
in an identical fashion using the EOG math and combined test scores.  Table 3 displays 
the results of these regressions.      
Table 3 
REGRESSION OF CURRENT EOG SCORES ON PRIOR EOG SCORES, GRADES 4-8 
READING 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STANDARD ERROR P-VALUE 
Grade Indicators (Gig) 
Grade 4 (G4) 7.0 .79 0.00 
Grade 5 (G5) 19.5 .80 0.00 
Grade 6 (G6) -15.6 .84 0.00 
Grade 7 (G7) -17.1 .82 0.00 
Constant (a0) 54.3 .57 0.00 
Interaction Terms (Gig  x readpriori)  
G4 x readprior .77 .002 0.00 
G5 x readprior .73 .002 0.00 
G6 x readprior .86 .002 0.00 
G7 x readprior .87 .002 0.00 
G8 x readprior .80 .002 0.00 
Adjusted R2 = .7211 
 
MATHEMATICS 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STANDARD ERROR P-VALUE 
Grade Indicators (Gig) 
Grade 4 (G4) -39.1 .92 0.00 
Grade 5 (G5) -41.2 .80 0.00 
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Grade 6 (G6) -13.7 .73 0.00 
Grade 7 (G7) -48.2 .72 0.00 
Constant (a0) 42.2 .47 0.00 
Interaction Terms (Gig x mathpriori)  
G4 x mathprior 1.01 .003 0.00 
G5 x mathprior 1.01 .003 0.00 
G6 x mathprior .91 .002 0.00 
G7 x mathprior 1.03 .002 0.00 
G8 x mathprior .86 .002 0.00 
Adjusted R2 = .7910 
 
COMBINED 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STANDARD ERROR P-VALUE 
Grade Indicators (Gig) 
Grade 4 (G4) -21.3 1.40 0.00 
Grade 5 (G5) -16.8 1.33 0.00 
Grade 6 (G6) -31.2 1.31 0.00 
Grade 7 (G7) -68.6 1.28 0.00 
Constant (a0) 69.5 .86 0.00 
Interaction Terms (Gig x combpriori)  
G4 x combprior .92 .002 0.00 
G5 x combprior .91 .002 0.00 
G6 x combprior .94 .002 0.00 
G7 x combprior 1.00 .002 0.00 
G8 x combprior .88 .002 0.00 
Adjusted R2 = .8332 
 
SOURCE. –  North Carolina Education Research Data Center, EOG Grades 4-8, 2003-2004 
 
 26 
From these regressions, it is clear that prior EOG scores are a strong predictor of 
current student test performance.  For each grade, the coefficients on both the reading and 
math prior score interaction terms are highly statistically significant (p-value= 0.00) and 
positive, indicating, as expected, that high test scores in the previous year are correlated 
with high scores in the current year.  For example, this regression predicts that on the 
fourth grade EOG reading exam in 2004, a given student will score 77% of his or her 
reported score on the third grade EOG reading exam in 2003, plus a grade-specific 
constant of 61.3 points (G4 + a0).  Given the shift in mastery level score cutoffs between 
grades, this translates to roughly the same level of mastery between years.  Thus, a 
student who performed at grade-level (level III) in grade three is expected to again score 
at grade-level for grade four in the following year.  This is consistent with the previously 
discussed developmental scale structure of the EOG exams.   
In interpreting these results, it is essential to note that the relationship between 
current scores and prior scores represents correlation, not causation.  The prior score 
variable absorbs the compounding effects of individual student characteristics (sex, 
ethnicity, parental education level, ability, etc.) and teacher differences.  This explains 
why, in all of the above regressions, the R2 values are relatively high.  When all grades 
are aggregated together, prior test scores explain roughly 72% of the variation in current 
EOG reading scores, 79% of the variation in current EOG math scores, and 83% of the 
variation in current EOG combined scores.  Thus, a natural next step is to separate out the 
effects of student characteristics and teacher differences.   
Teachers and students are linked in the data through an identification coding 
system.  In the EOG dataset, each student is linked to the teacher (through the teachid 
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variable) that proctored his or her exam.  For the elementary grades (grades three through 
five), the teacher who proctors a student’s exam is almost always the student’s classroom 
teacher.  Though this match rate is lower for middle school students (grades six through 
eight), for the sake of my analysis (which focuses on grades four through eight) I assume 
that the specified teacher is the student’s actual classroom teacher.  
Ideally, to isolate teacher effects, I would like to add an indicator variable for each 
individual teacher into regressions (1), (2), and (3).  As this would need to include a 
variable for each individual teacher, it is obviously impossible given the constraints of the 
data analysis software.  Instead, using the same dataset, I use an absorbing indicators 
regression to estimate teacher fixed effects for each of the two EOG subject scores.  This 
absorbing indicators regression is exactly equivalent to a standard regression with an 
indicator variable for each teacher. 
Table 4 displays the results of these three regressions, specified below.  
(4) readi = a0 + a1g Gig + a2g(Gig x readpriori) +TeacherFEj + ui, 
(5) mathi = a0 + a1g Gig + a2g(Gig x mathpriori) + TeacherFEj + ui, 
(6) combi = a0 + a1g Gig + a2g(Gig x combpriori) +TeacherFEj + ui, 
where TeacherFEj is teacher j’s estimated fixed effect on student i’s current (2004) EOG 
score.  
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Table 4 
ABSORBED LINEAR REGRESSION OF CURRENT EOG SCORES ON PRIOR EOG SCORES, 
GRADES 4-8 
 
READING 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STANDARD ERROR P-VALUE 
Grade Indicators (Gig) 
Grade 4 (G4) -5.4 1.17 0.00 
Grade 5 (G5) 7.8 1.16 0.00 
Grade 6 (G6) -16.3 1.01 0.00 
Grade 7 (G7) -17.0 .98 0.00 
Constant (a0) 74.1 .74 0.00 
Interaction Terms (Gig x readpriori)  
G4 x readprior .74 .002 0.00 
G5 x readprior .69 .002 0.00 
G6 x readprior .79 .003 0.00 
G7 x readprior .80 .003 0.00 
G8 x readprior .73 .003 0.00 
Adjusted R2 = .7400 
 
MATHEMATICS 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STANDARD ERROR P-VALUE 
Grade Indicators (Gig) 
Grade 4 (G4) -46.8 1.22 0.00 
Grade 5 (G5) -47.5 1.12 0.00 
Grade 6 (G6) -12.6 .86 0.00 
Grade 7 (G7) -42.4 .85 0.00 
Constant (a0) 57.7 .63 0.00 
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Interaction Terms (Gig x mathpriori)  
G4 x mathprior .97 .003 0.00 
G5 x mathprior .97 .003 0.00 
G6 x mathprior .85 .002 0.00 
G7 x mathprior .96 .002 0.00 
G8 x mathprior .80 .002 0.00 
Adjusted R2 = .8237 
 
COMBINED 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STANDARD ERROR P-VALUE 
Grade Indicators (Gig) 
Grade 4 (G4) -35.5 1.95 0.00 
Grade 5 (G5) -28.9 1.88 0.00 
Grade 6 (G6) -30.3 1.60 0.00 
Grade 7 (G7) -62.6 1.56 0.00 
Constant (a0) 96.2 1.16 0.00 
Interaction Terms (Gig x combpriori)  
G4 x combprior .89 .002 0.00 
G5 x combprior .88 .002 0.00 
G6 x combprior .89 .002 0.00 
G7 x combprior .95 .002 0.00 
G8 x combprior .83 .002 0.00 
Adjusted R2 = .8529 
 
SOURCE. –  North Carolina Education Research Data Center, EOG Grades 4-8, 2003-2004 
 
 As expected, the coefficients on the prior reading, math, and combined scores in 
Table 4 fell (as compared to regressions (1), (2), and (3), respectively).  Though there is 
still a significant positive correlation between current score and prior score, the 
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magnitude of this relationship is smaller when teacher effects are separated from prior 
scores.  Let us return to our previous example.  As previously noted, regression (1) in 
Table 3 predicts that for a fourth-grade student in 2004, his or her EOG reading score will 
be 77% of his or her score on the EOG reading exam for grade three in 2003 (plus a 
constant of 61.3 points).  With the addition of teacher fixed effects, regression (3) in 
Table 4 now predicts that the student’s score on the EOG reading exam in 2004 will be 
74% of his or her prior reading score, plus the fixed effect of his or her teacher in 2004 
(plus a constant of 68.7 points).  This demonstrates that teachers do have an impact on 
student test scores.   
 The adjusted R2 values in Table 4 indicate that prior scores and teacher fixed 
effects together account for around 74% of the variation in current EOG reading test 
scores, 82% of the variation in current EOG math test scores, and 85% of the variation in 
current EOG combined test scores.  This increase in adjusted R2 (from 72%, 79%, and 
83%, respectively) is expected, given that regressions (4), (5), and (6) introduce a 
separate variable for teacher differences into the equation.       
 Let us now turn to a discussion of teacher fixed effects, a proxy for teacher 
quality.  Teacher fixed effects are defined as a teacher’s average effect on the test scores 
of his or her students in a given year.  For example, let’s say that a teacher’s fixed effect 
on EOG reading scores is measured to be 1.5.  This means that averaging across all 
students in his or her classroom, a 1.5 point increase in reading test scores is attributable 
to the teacher in that given year.  This is meant to capture the aspects of teaching that are 
difficult to quantify and observe, but are constant within a classroom. 
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 Using the fixed effects estimation given by the absorbed linear regressions above, 
Table 5 gives a statistical summary of teacher fixed effects on EOG scores.  Note that 
these results are consistent with prior literature, which suggests that teachers are 
responsible for roughly 8-15% of a standard deviation in student test scores in a given 
year.26  Figures 3, 4, and 5 provide a graphical distribution of the teacher fixed effects on 
each subject test score. 
Table 5 
SUMMARY OF TEACHER FIXED EFFECTS ON EOG SCORES, GRADES 4-8 
SUBJECT TOTAL OBSERVATIONS MINIMUM MAXIMUM MEAN 
STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
Reading 328987 -24.2 19.9 8.43e-10 2.1 
Mathematics 328987 -19.5 15.9 2.99e-10 2.4 
Combined 328987 -26.6 33.6 3.39e-10 3.9 
 
SOURCE. –  North Carolina Education Research Data Center, EOG Grades 4-8, 2003-2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26 Hugh Macartney, “The Dynamic Effects of Educational Accountability,” National Bureau of Economic 
Research Working Paper 19915 (2014): 4.   
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Figure 3 
DISTRIBUTION OF TEACHER FIXED EFFECTS ON EOG READING SCORES, GRADES 4-8 
 
SOURCE. –  North Carolina Education Research Data Center, EOG Grades 4-8, 2003-2004 
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Figure 4 
DISTRIBUTION OF TEACHER FIXED EFFECTS ON EOG MATHEMATICS SCORES, GRADES 4-8 
 
SOURCE. –  North Carolina Education Research Data Center, EOG Grades 4-8, 2003-2004 
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Figure 5 
DISTRIBUTION OF TEACHER FIXED EFFECTS ON EOG COMBINED SCORES, GRADES 4-8 
 
 
SOURCE. –  North Carolina Education Research Data Center, EOG Grades 4-8, 2003-2004 
 
 For reading, mathematics, and combined scores, teacher fixed effects are 
normally distributed around a mean of roughly zero.  This is the case by design, as 
teacher fixed effects are constructed by taking the residuals from a standard regression 
without teacher fixed effects (which are normally distributed around a mean of zero) and 
taking means by teacher.  Since there are a sufficient number of teachers, the distribution 
remains normal.    However, when disaggregating teacher fixed effects by years of 
teacher district experience, a different pattern emerges.  This is addressed in Section V. 
 C.  Teacher District Experience 
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 The final explanatory variable central to this analysis is teacher district 
experience, defined as consecutive years of teaching experience in the same district. As 
tenure is awarded to teachers by district (see section II for more detail), it is necessary to 
separate years teaching within the same district from total years of teaching experience.  
To construct this district experience variable, I first sort the teacher pay dataset (which 
contains teacher experience) by teacher identification code (teachid).  Given the range of 
the previously specified tenure bubble (years one through eight), I begin with the 2004 
dataset to allow for up to eight years of experience within a district (collection of this 
dataset began in 1996).  Using a district code (leacode), the data indicates which school 
district employs each teacher in that given year.  By merging the data for each year and 
looking at the matching between the district code in a given year with that in the previous 
year, I am able to build a district experience variable for each teacher, ranging from one 
to eight years of teaching experience within a district.  To clarify, a teacher with one year 
of district experience has just completed his or her first year of teaching within a district, 
while a teacher with eight years of district experience has taught in the same district for 
eight or more consecutive years.  This district experience variable spans the range of the 
previously specified tenure bubble.  It should be noted that this variable measures district-
specific experience, not necessarily experience teaching in the same school or at the same 
grade.  Additionally, as teachers can move between districts, it does not necessarily 
capture total years of teaching experience either.  However, since tenure is awarded at the 
district level, district experience is sufficient for this analysis.   
As previously explained in the background section, teachers in North Carolina are 
eligible for tenure after four years of teaching in the same district.  Thus, it is reasonable 
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to assume that a teacher with more than four years of experience in a district has tenure, 
while those with four or fewer years of district experience are probationary (non-tenured) 
teachers.  Using this fact along with the district experience variable, I construct an 
indicator variable for whether or not a teacher has tenure (tenure=1 if teacher is tenured, 
tenure=0 otherwise).  Table 6 provides a summary of the district experience and tenure 
variables. 
Table 6 
YEARS OF TEACHER EXPERIENCE WITHIN A SCHOOL DISTRICT  
VARIABLE TOTAL OBSERVATIONS MEAN 
STANDARD 
DEVIATION MEDIAN 
DISTRICT 
EXPERIENCE 352772 5.9 2.3 7.0 
TENURE INDICATOR 352772 .67 .47 1.0 
 
SOURCE. –  North Carolina Education Research Data Center, Teacher Pay, 1996-2004 
 
 The average teacher in this sample has roughly 5.9 years of experience in a 
specific district, indicating that the average teacher is tenured.  This sample exhibits a 
large standard deviation relative to its mean, thus the median (seven years of district 
experience) is presented as an alternative measure.  These results are interpreted keeping 
in mind that a teacher with a district experience value of eight years actually has eight or 
more years of experience within a district, thus actual average district experience is 
potentially higher.  However, given the focus of my analysis, this does not impact my 
empirical specification or results. 
 From the tenure indicator variable, we can conclude that 67% of teachers in this 
sample have tenure.  Though this is interesting in and of itself, the relationship of these 
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two variables (district experience and tenure status) to teacher quality is essential to my 
main empirical analysis.  
V.  Empirical Specification and Results 
 Given the discussed measures of teacher tenure (given by district experience) and 
teacher quality (given by teacher fixed effects), the discussion now moves to an 
examination of the relationship between the two.  Since this relationship is unknown, a 
non-parametric specification is used to compare average teacher quality across the tenure 
bubble (district experience years one through eight).  The first step in this analysis is a 
plot comparing district experience (x-axis) and teacher fixed effects (y-axis).  Each point 
represents a single teacher’s fixed effect measure relative to his or her years of district 
experience.  Figures 6, 7, and 8 display this plot for teacher fixed effects on EOG reading, 
mathematics, and combined scores, respectively.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 38 
Figure 6 
 TEACHER FIXED EFFECTS ON EOG READING SCORES BY TEACHER DISTRICT EXPERIENCE  
 
 
 
SOURCE. –  North Carolina Education Research Data Center, Teacher Pay, 1996-2004 
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Figure 7 
TEACHER FIXED EFFECTS ON EOG MATHEMATICS SCORES BY TEACHER DISTRICT 
EXPERIENCE 
 
 
SOURCE. –  North Carolina Education Research Data Center, Teacher Pay, 1996-2004 
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Figure 8 
TEACHER FIXED EFFECTS ON EOG COMBINED SCORES BY TEACHER DISTRICT EXPERIENCE 
 
 
 
SOURCE. –  North Carolina Education Research Data Center, Teacher Pay, 1996-2004 
 
 Each point on Figures 6, 7, and 8 represents a single teacher’s unique (years of 
district experience, fixed effect) pair.  As depicted in each of the figures, these points 
come together to create a vertical line for each year of district experience.  The length of 
this line represents the range of teacher fixed effects for teachers within that year of 
district experience (the line for the eighth year represents teachers with eight or more 
years of district experience).  In other words, the length of each line is the range of 
teacher quality within that year of district experience.  One can also imagine that these 
three figures have a third dimension, which is the frequency of observations along any 
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given vertical line.  The third dimension of each vertical line gives the distribution of 
teacher fixed effects within each year of district experience.   
 Since this portion of the analysis is interested in teachers within a given level of 
district experience in the aggregate, the fixed effects are then averaged.  Taking an 
average of the teacher fixed effects within each year gives a single point for each district 
experience year.  This gives eight pairs of (year of district experience, average teacher 
fixed effect) data points for each subject.  These data points, as well as the confidence 
intervals around the mean, are given in Table 7, for fixed effects on reading, 
mathematics, and combined scores.  Figures 9, 10, and 11 display this information 
graphically.  The dots surrounding the mean on the figures represent the upper and lower 
bounds of the 95% confidence intervals given in Table 7. 
Table 7 
AVERAGE TEACHER FIXED EFFECTS BY YEARS OF DISTRICT EXPERIENCE 
READING 
YEARS OF 
DISTRICT 
EXPERIENCE 
TOTAL 
OBSERVATIONS MEAN 
STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
CONFIDENCE 
INTERVAL 
(95%) 
1 13772 -.36 2.08 [-.40, -.33] 
2 15374 -.21 2.12 [-.24, -.18] 
3 36035 -.30 2.08 [-.32, -.28] 
4 41652 -.30 2.11 [-.32, -.28] 
5 25718 -.09 2.07 [-.11, -.06] 
6 22223 .04 2.04 [.01, .07] 
7 18185 .11 2.03 [.08, .13] 
8 156028 .20 2.06 [.19, .21] 
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MATHEMATICS 
YEARS OF 
DISTRICT 
EXPERIENCE 
TOTAL 
OBSERVATIONS MEAN 
STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
CONFIDENCE 
INTERVAL 
(95%) 
1 13772 -.32 2.42 [-.36, -.28] 
2 15374 -.25 2.38 [-.29, -.22] 
3 36035 -.42 2.36 [-.44, -.39] 
4 41652 -.31 2.25 [-.33, -.29] 
5 25718 -.07 2.37 [-.10, -.04] 
6 22223 .04 2.31 [.01, .07] 
7 18185 .06 2.29 [.03, .10] 
8 156028 .23 2.36 [.22, .24]  
COMBINED 
YEARS OF 
DISTRICT 
EXPERIENCE 
TOTAL 
OBSERVATIONS MEAN 
STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
CONFIDENCE 
INTERVAL 
(95%) 
1 13772 -.57 3.88 [-.63, -.50] 
2 15374 -.37 3.87 [-.43, -.30] 
3 36035 -.64 3.83 [-.68, -.60] 
4 41652 -.53 3.81 [-.56, -.49] 
5 25718 -.13 3.86 [-.18, -.09] 
6 22223 .06 3.81 [.01, .11] 
7 18185 .12 3.79 [.06, .17] 
8 156028 .38 3.85 [.36, .39] 
 
SOURCE. –  North Carolina Education Research Data Center, Teacher Pay, 1996-2004 
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Figure 9 
AVERAGE TEACHER FIXED EFFECTS ON EOG READING SCORES BY YEARS OF DISTRICT 
EXPERIENCE 
 
 
SOURCE. –  North Carolina Education Research Data Center, Teacher Pay, 1996-2004 
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Figure 10 
AVERAGE TEACHER FIXED EFFECTS ON EOG MATHEMATICS SCORES BY YEARS OF 
DISTRICT EXPERIENCE 
 
 
 
SOURCE. –  North Carolina Education Research Data Center, Teacher Pay, 1996-2004 
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Figure 11 
AVERAGE TEACHER FIXED EFFECTS ON EOG COMBINED SCORES BY YEARS OF DISTRICT 
EXPERIENCE 
 
 
SOURCE. –  North Carolina Education Research Data Center, Teacher Pay, 1996-2004 
 
 As expected, these plots show there is an observed positive correlation between 
average teacher fixed effects and years of district experience.  This means that, in 
general, average teacher quality increases as years of district experience increase.  For 
example, on average, teachers with four years of district teaching experience are more 
effective than those with three years of district teaching experience.  This comparison is 
not necessarily between individual teachers in the same district, but rather in the 
aggregate of all teachers with a given level of district experience, across districts.   
 46 
 Furthermore, it is clear that there is an empirically observable relationship 
between years of district experience and teacher fixed effects across the tenure bubble.  
Given that teachers in North Carolina are eligible for tenure after four years of teaching 
in the same district, an analysis of tenure policy draws our attention to the change in 
average teacher fixed effects between years four and five.  For fixed effects on EOG 
reading scores (Figure 9), there is a large jump in the graph in this interval.  Consistent 
with the previous discussion, teachers with five years of district experience are on 
average of higher quality than those with four years of district experience.  However, this 
jump is a clear break in the trend of the plot.  This picture suggests that there is a change 
in teacher quality between four and five years of district experience beyond just the 
expected increase that comes with an additional year of teaching experience.  This means 
that low quality teachers do not persist in the same district after year four, causing the 
average fixed effect for teachers with five years of district experience to be substantially 
higher.  The teacher fixed effects on EOG math scores (Figure 10) and combined scores 
(Figure 11) exhibit a similar trend.   
 Looking at the confidence intervals surrounding in the means on each figure, it is 
clear that this effect is statistically significant at the 5% level.  This can be seen by the 
fact that the mean within year four is not included in the 95% confidence interval for year 
five.  It should be noted that, in each of the three plots, the confidence interval for year 
eight is very narrow.  Given that year eight includes all teachers with eight or more years 
of experience in a district, it is unsurprising that this category includes more observations, 
and thus exhibits a very narrow confidence interval around the mean.   
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 In the context of tenure, these results suggest that the tenure process exhibits 
strong positive selection, meaning that low quality teachers are not awarded tenure.  This 
is consistent with the goals of teacher hiring policy- to retain high quality teachers while 
removing those that are less effective.  Thus, in this sense, North Carolina’s current 
teacher tenure policy proves to be effective.  
 This analysis demonstrates that not only is there a sharp break in the figures at the 
tenure bubble, but also suggests that returns to district level experience on teaching 
effectiveness increase after the tenure bubble.  Though less pronounced, this trend is 
visible in each of the three figures and is statistically significant at the 5% level.  This 
result suggests that the tenure process not only selects the more effective teachers at the 
time, but also selects teachers with a higher propensity for growth.  An alternative 
argument, which is used to justify tenure at the research and university level, is that the 
job security provided by tenure encourages teacher innovation and improvement.  While 
further analysis is needed to come to a decisive conclusion, it is likely that this result is 
the product of a combination of these two explanations.   
VI.  Conclusion 
 As there are other possible explanations for the observed relationship between 
teacher tenure and teacher quality, this analysis does not provide a definitive answer on 
its causation.  However, it is clear that on average, tenured teachers are of higher 
demonstrated quality than probationary teachers, beyond the expected increase in quality 
attributable to more experienced teachers.  Thus, it is clear that teacher tenure policy does 
play an important role in raising overall teacher quality and effectiveness. 
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This study of tenure is particularly timely, as the North Carolina legislature 
recently passed a sweeping tenure reform, which is slated to gradually go into effect over 
the next five years.27  The new tenure reform eliminates the existing four-year teacher 
tenure eligibility rule, limiting tenure only to the 25% percent of public school teachers in 
the state who are deemed most effective (effectiveness criteria has not yet been 
specified).  Other teachers will be eligible for four-, two-, and one-year contracts, 
depending on their experience and demonstrated effectiveness.  North Carolina is not the 
first state to radically alter its tenure policies, as Louisiana, South Dakota, Idaho, 
Colorado, and Florida, among others, have recently made changes as well.28   
Though the North Carolina legislation has already been passed, it has not yet been 
implemented.  Thus, it is important to examine the current tenure policy and its 
relationship to teacher quality before any drastic changes are made.  My research serves 
two unique purposes in this respect.  Qualitatively, it provides a summary of the existing 
policy and its implementation.  Empirically, the introduction of the tenure indicator 
variable and tenure bubble is unique to my analysis and adds another component to the 
already rich literature on teacher quality.  Furthermore, by focusing on the fact that 
teacher tenure is awarded at the district level, rather than on total years of teaching 
experience, my research deviates from the existing literature examining the relationship 
between teacher experience and teacher effectiveness.  
This empirical analysis could inform policy research as well, potentially revealing 
any unanticipated effects a change in tenure policy may have on teacher effectiveness.  
                                                 
27  Bonner, “Proposed NC Budget Would End Teacher Tenure, Pay Tuition Vouchers,” July 21, 2013, 
 
28 Adrienne Lu, “North Carolina Ends Teacher Tenure,” Stateline, July 29, 2013, http://www.pewstates.org/projects/stateline/headlines/north-­‐carolina-­‐ends-­‐teacher-­‐tenure-­‐85899493655.   
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Once changes are made to North Carolina’s teacher tenure policy, it would be interesting 
to do follow up research in the future examining how teacher effectiveness changes after 
the implementation of the new policy. 
It should also be noted that the analysis and results presented here apply to a non-
union state.  As an area for further research, it would be interesting to see if the same 
findings are present in states where there is a strong teachers’ union.  One could also 
imagine carrying out this analysis in a state or district that explicitly uses student test 
score performance to dictate teacher hiring and retention practices.    
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Appendix: EOG Test Score Distributions (Grades 5-8) 
 
 
Figure A.1 
EOG READING SCORE DISTRIBUTION, GRADE 5 
 
SOURCE. –  North Carolina Education Research Data Center, EOG Grade 5, 2004 
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Figure A.2 
EOG MATHEMATICS SCORE DISTRIBUTION, GRADE 5  
 
 
SOURCE. –  North Carolina Education Research Data Center, EOG Grade 5, 2004 
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Figure A.3 
EOG READING SCORE DISTRIBUTION, GRADE 6  
 
 
SOURCE. –  North Carolina Education Research Data Center, EOG Grade 6, 2004 
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Figure A.4 
EOG MATHEMATICS SCORE DISTRIBUTION, GRADE 6  
 
 
SOURCE. –  North Carolina Education Research Data Center, EOG Grade 6, 2004 
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Figure A.5 
EOG READING SCORE DISTRIBUTION, GRADE 7 
 
 
SOURCE. –  North Carolina Education Research Data Center, EOG Grade 7, 2004 
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Figure A.6 
EOG MATHEMATICS SCORE DISTRIBUTION, GRADE 7  
 
 
SOURCE. –  North Carolina Education Research Data Center, EOG Grade 7, 2004 
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Figure A.7 
EOG READING SCORE DISTRIBUTION, GRADE 8 
 
 
SOURCE. –  North Carolina Education Research Data Center, EOG Grade 8, 2004 
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Figure A.8 
EOG MATHEMATICS SCORE DISTRIBUTION, GRADE 8 
 
 
SOURCE. –  North Carolina Education Research Data Center, EOG Grade 8, 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
